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Introduction
The conflict between protecting the nation’s economy and preserving the
global environment is a constant force in the creation and implementation
of federal law. In the context of statutory interpretation, the meanings that
words carry have significant consequences for how courts apply the law.
How an agency or court interprets a single word in a statute can determine
the implementation of the statute. When the government does not request
that a court defer to the interpretation of the agency in charge of
implementing the statute, the court should examine the statute’s terms as
well as objectives to determine the meaning that Congress likely intended
the statutory language to convey. In cases of ambiguous statutory language,
discovering the statute’s purpose based on its context enables the court to
decide whether to construe the language narrowly or broadly to achieve that
purpose.
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The power of statutory interpretation is evident in the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable
Fuels Association, in which six justices formed the majority and three
justices formed the dissent.1 The majority opinion’s interpretation of
Congress’s use of the term “extension” in 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9), a
provision of the Clean Air Act’s renewable fuel standards, increases the
number of small oil refineries that are able to seek exemptions from the
statute’s requirements. The Supreme Court’s recent decision implicates the
potential environmental consequences of statutory interpretation based on a
“permissible construction” rather than the “ordinary meaning” of a single
term in the federal statute mandating the incorporation of renewable fuels in
refineries’ production of transportation fuels. As Earth’s supply of
nonrenewable resources continues to diminish, the holding in Hollyfrontier
encourages small refineries to rely on the chance that they will be unable to
comply with statutory requirements in certain years, rather than adapt to
economic changes, which could spell disaster for future energy production.
Furthermore, the Court’s reliance on a permissible construction of a term in
a federal statute may create a precedent for future cases that affect the
global environment as well as the national economy.
The deference that a court gives to the interpretation of the language of a
statute by the federal agency that implements the legislation may result in a
continuation of implementation that defeats the goals of the statute. The
Supreme Court created a precedent for such deference more than thirty
years ago in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.2 By granting certiorari in 2021 for Hollyfrontier, the Court acquired the
opportunity to interpret a statute that promotes renewable fuel production
differently than the federal agency in charge of implementing the statute. 3
The Court declined to take advantage of this opportunity and instead
appeared to defer to the EPA’s interpretation—which may conflict with the
legislation’s ultimate environmental and economic objectives—due to the
absence of a single adjective from the statute. As a result, the Court may
have enabled such an omission of a superfluous word to change the course
of environmental history by reducing the pressure on small refineries to
incorporate renewable resources in the production of fuels.
Section I of this Note will explore three historical precedents the
Supreme Court has created through canons of statutory interpretation in
1. 141 S. Ct. 2172 (2021).
2. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
3. See Hollyfrontier, 141 S. Ct. at 2180.
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order to arrive at a comprehensive guide for the contemporary construction
of statutory language to which courts should adhere. These three precedents
are the ordinary meaning, permissible construction, and fair reading rules of
statutory interpretation. Section II will explain the history of congressional
statutes that resulted in the need for the Supreme Court to interpret the
meaning of the statutory language at issue in Hollyfrontier Cheyenne
Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Association. Furthermore, Section II will
examine the goals of those statutes in order to analyze whether the Court
interpreted the statutory language in accordance with such goals. Section III
will evaluate the Supreme Court’s decision in Hollyfrontier through a brief
outline of the facts and procedural history of the case, followed by the
holding and ruling of the case as well as an analysis of the Court’s
rationale. After a discussion of the majority opinion, Section III will cover
the dissenting opinion and its rationale. Finally, Section IV will discuss the
adverse effects that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hollyfrontier may
create for the environment and the creation of legislation.
I. Statutory Interpretation Precedents
The Supreme Court has established rules for statutory interpretation in
previous cases. It has based a variety of decisions on the ordinary meaning
canon of statutory interpretation.4 In contrast, regarding decisions of the
EPA and other federal agencies when implementing federal statutes, the
Court has previously adhered to the permissible construction canon of
statutory interpretation.5 When a statutory exception is at issue, rather than
compelling itself and other courts to construe a statutory exemption
narrowly, the Court has stated that it has “no license to give the exemption
anything but a fair reading.”6 In HollyFrontier, the Court implicitly utilized
the permissible construction and fair reading precedential rules of statutory
interpretation while appearing to ignore—despite claiming to follow—the
ordinary meaning rule when determining the significance of Congress’s use
of the term “extension” regarding exemptions in 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9).7

4. See, e.g., Minor v. Mechanics’ Bank of Alexandria, 26 U.S. 46, 64 (1928); Banks v.
Chi. Grain Trimmers, 390 U.S. 459, 465 (1968); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580–581
(1975); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S.
223, 228 (1993); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994).
5. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (1984); Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138
S.Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018).
6. Encino, 138 at 1142.
7. See 141 S. Ct. 2172.
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A. The Ordinary Meaning Canon
One of the most fundamental rules of statutory interpretation is to
consider the ordinary meaning of a word or phrase in a statute. In 1828, the
Supreme Court expressed this canon of statutory construction in Minor v.
Mechanics’ Bank of Alexandria: “[t]he ordinary meaning of the language,
must be presumed to be intended, unless it would manifestly defeat the
object of the provisions.”8 Since then, the Court has reiterated this canon in
numerous cases and has elaborated on what it considers to be an “ordinary
meaning”9 by adding other qualifiers such as “natural meaning”10 and
“contemporary, common meaning.”11 The Court has also clarified that it
will look to such meanings when the statute itself does not define the
language in question.12 Unless there are “persuasive reasons to the
contrary,” the Court should construe statutory language in accordance with
its ordinary meaning.13
While a term may have a different meaning in one context than in
another, the Supreme Court has previously considered a term’s meaning in
the legal context to determine its ordinary meaning for purposes of statutory
interpretation.14 In 1994, the Supreme Court adhered to the ordinary
meaning canon of statutory construction while considering the meaning of
the term “cognizable” in the legal context to determine term’s meaning in a
federal statute in FDIC v. Meyer.15 John H. Meyer was a senior officer of
Fidelity Savings and Loan Association (“Fidelity”) whose employment the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) terminated
while attempting to restore the solvency of Fidelity as its receiver.16 Meyer
sued FSLIC and Robert L. Pattullo, the special representative through
whom FSLIC terminated Meyer’s employment, under the claim that “his
summary discharge deprived him of a property right (his right to continued
employment under California law) without due process of law in violation
of the Fifth Amendment.”17 In the United States District Court for the
8. 26 U.S. at 64.
9. See, e.g., Smith, 508 U.S. at 228; Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42.
10. Smith, 508 U.S. at 228.
11. Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42.
12. See. e.g., id.; Smith, 508 U.S. at 228; FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994).
13. Banks v. Chi. Grain Trimmers, 390 U.S. 459, 465 (1968); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S.
575, 580–81 (1975).
14. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 476.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 473.
17. Id. at 473–74.
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Northern District of California, “[t]he jury returned a $130,000 verdict
against FSLIC, but found in favor of Pattullo on qualified immunity
grounds.”18 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling after the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) appealed as FLSIC’s statutory successor.19 After
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States considered the
meaning of the term “cognizable” in the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)
since, “if a suit is ‘cognizable’ under § 1346(b) of the FTCA, the FTCA
remedy is ‘exclusive’ and the federal agency cannot be sued ‘in its own
name.’”20 The Court explicitly employed Black’s Law Dictionary’s
definition of “cognizable” to determine the ordinary meaning of the term.21
It concluded that Meyer properly sued the FSLIC “‘in its own name’” as the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) did not provide the exclusive remedy for
the claim “because Meyer's constitutional tort claim is not cognizable
under § 1346(b)” of the FTCA.22 However, the Court reversed the lower
court’s judgment on other grounds.23 While the ultimate ruling did not turn
on the ordinary meaning of a statutory term, the Court relied on the
ordinary meaning canon of statutory construction in its analysis of the
Federal Tort Claims Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity for federal
agencies.
When construing the significance of any ambiguous statutory word or
phrase that the statute itself does not define, the Court should adhere to the
long-standing precedent that it has set by considering the ordinary meaning
of such language. As long as the circumstances of the case before the Court
do not persuade it to interpret the word or phrase in accordance with an
extraordinary meaning,24 the Court can assume that Congress intended the
significance of the statutory language to match its “natural”25 or
“contemporary, common”26 definition. The Court may rely on the Black’s
Law Dictionary definition of the word or phrase, as it did in FDIC v.

18. Id. at 474.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 478.
21. Id. at 476.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 486.
24. See Banks v. Chi. Grain Trimmers, 390 U.S. 459, 465 (1968); Burns v. Alcala, 420
U.S. 575, 580–81 (1975).
25. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).
26. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
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Meyer,27 in order to determine its ordinary meaning. Nevertheless, courts
should avoid a construction of statutory language that conflicts with the
goals of the statute.28 The ordinary meaning canon of construction
encourages predictability of statutory interpretation by guiding courts to
construe statutory language in accordance with the same significance as
such language has in ordinary communication.
B. The Permissible Construction Canon
In contrast to the ordinary meaning canon, the permissible construction
canon of statutory interpretation enables courts to defer to the implementing
agency’s definition of a word or phrase in a statute, at least regarding EPA
decisions.29 Thus, even if the agency does not define the statutory language
in accordance with its ordinary meaning, the agency’s definition controls if
a court determines that it is “permissible.” Nevertheless, the permissible
construction canon imposes the same restrictions regarding statutory goals
upon such definitions as the ordinary construction canon does.30
In 1984, the Supreme Court articulated the permissible construction
canon for the review of the EPA’s construction of a statute in Chevron U. S.
A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. According to the Court,
“if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”31 However, the Court also noted
that “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction
and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent.”32 In fact, the Court recognized “[i]f a court,
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is
the law and must be given effect.”33 Similarly, in more recent cases, the
Court has acknowledged that an agency’s construction of a statute must be
“within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.”34

27. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 476.
28. See Minor v. Mechanics’ Bank of Alexandria, 26 U.S. 46, 64 (1928).
29. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
30. See id. n.9 (citations omitted); Minor, 26 U.S. at 64.
31. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
32. Id. n.9 (citations omitted).
33. Id.
34. E.g., City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013); Util. Air Regul.
Grp. V. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014) (citation omitted); Michigan v. E.P.A., 576 U.S.
743, 751 (2015) (citation omitted).
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In Chevron, after the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit vacated EPA regulations allowing States to define the
term “stationary source” on a plantwide basis, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether such a definition was a reasonable
construction of the amended Clean Air Act’s use of the term in its permit
program.35 In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to require states
that failed to meet the EPA’s national air quality standards to regulate
“‘new or modified major stationary sources’” of air pollution through a
permit program.36 In determining whether Congress expressed its intent for
the EPA to narrowly or flexibly construe “stationary source” in the
amended Clean Air Act, the Court explained that “[t]he legislative
history . . . does not contain any specific comment on . . . the question
whether a plantwide definition of a stationary source is permissible under
the permit program.”37 Nevertheless, the Court noted that the legislative
history “does, however, plainly disclose that in the permit program
Congress sought to accommodate the conflict between the economic
interest in permitting capital improvements to continue and the
environmental interest in improving air quality.”38 The Court reversed the
appellate court’s judgment and held that the EPA’s interpretation of
“stationary source” was a permissible construction that intended to promote
Congress’s dual objectives of economic growth and environmental
protection.39 Since Congress never expressed any disapproval of the EPA’s
flexible statutory construction that allowed states to treat an entire plant as a
stationary source, the Court deferred to the agency’s interpretation of the
statutory term in its implementation of the amended Clean Air Act.40 As the
relevant statute did not explicitly construe the term at issue in Chevron, the
Supreme Court deferred to the EPA’s permissible definition of statutory
language while ensuring that the agency’s definition adhered to the
statutory goals.
C. The Fair Reading Rule
Courts may utilize multiple rules of statutory interpretation
simultaneously to arrive at a construction of statutory language. Along with
canons such as the ordinary meaning rule of statutory interpretation, a court
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840–42.
Id. at 840.
Id. at 851.
Id.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 864.
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should determine whether it must interpret statutory language broadly or
narrowly. For example, the Supreme Court considered whether to interpret
a statutory exemption narrowly in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro.41
Service advisors for a Mercedes-Benz dealership sued their employer for
backpay based on the Department of Labor’s 2011 regulation that excluded
service advisors from its interpretation of the term “salesman” in the Fair
Labor Standards Act, which did not require overtime pay for a “salesman.”
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s
dismissal of the complaint due to its deference, as required under Chevron
when legislative text and history is ambiguous, to the Department of
Labor’s construction of the statutory term.42 However, the Supreme Court
vacated the appellate court’s judgment based on the inability of courts to
defer to interpretations of statutory language in agency regulations that are
procedurally defective, as was the 2011 Department of Labor regulation.43
The Court remanded to the appellate court the issue of whether the Fair
Labor Standards Act’s exemption of a “salesman” from its overtime pay
requirements included service advisors.44 The appellate court held that the
Fair Labor Standards Act did not exempt service advisors from its overtime
pay requirements because Congress did not intend for it to do so and
because courts should construe such exemptions narrowly.45
Nevertheless, in 2018, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s
ruling based at least partially on its conclusion that a service advisor is a
“salesman” according to the ordinary meaning of the term.46 The Court
interpreted the exemption in accordance with a fair reading “[b]ecause the
FLSA gives no ‘textual indication’ that its exemptions should be construed
narrowly.”47 Thus, a few years ago, the Supreme Court established a
precedent for construing terms in a statutory exemption on the basis of their
ordinary meaning as well as a fair reading rather than a narrow
interpretation. Therefore, the Court’s decision in HollyFrontier regarding
the statutory exemption from the renewable fuel program requirements
should have incorporated both the ordinary meaning canon and fair reading
rule of statutory construction.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018).
Id. at 1139.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1139–40.
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1142.
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II. History and Purpose of Relevant Environmental Legislation
When Congress amended the Clean Air Act by passing the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, it established the renewable fuel program to reduce the
use of fossil fuels in the production of motor vehicle fuels. 48 Congress
declared in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that the Energy Policy Act’s
ultimate objective is to “ensure jobs for our future with secure, affordable,
and reliable energy.”49 As the nation’s supply of nonrenewable resources
diminishes, fossil fuels become less reliable as energy sources. This lack of
reliability threatens jobs in the energy sector whose existence depends on
the supply of fuel sources. To prevent continuous reliance on fossil rules,
the renewable fuel program promotes the use of renewable biomass,
including “grain, starch, oilseeds, vegetable, animal, or fish materials,” in
the production of fuel for motor vehicles.50 Such materials are renewable
because they regenerate in a relatively short amount of time, especially
compared to fossil fuels. Due to the ability to quickly produce these
materials, their potential for depletion is not a significant concern.
Therefore, renewable resources provide a “secure, affordable, and
reliable”51 source of energy that can achieve Congress’s goal of protecting
future jobs, particularly those in the energy sector.
Within the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress included the Energy
Research, Development, Demonstration, and Commercial Application Act
of 2005, which expressed the following “general goals”:
(1) increasing the efficiency of all energy intensive sectors
through conservation and improved technologies;
(2) promoting diversity of energy supply;
(3) decreasing the dependence of the United States on foreign
energy supplies;
(4) improving the energy security of the United States; and
(5) decreasing the environmental impact of energy-related
activities.52

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Energy Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat 594 (2005).
Id.
Id. § 1501(a)(2).
Energy Policy Act.
Id., § 902(a).
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The renewable fuel program promotes these goals by discouraging
reliance on fossil fuels.53 As research and knowledge of renewable fuel
sources improves, federal laws that promote the use of such resources result
in the overall conservation of natural resources and, as a consequence,
increases the nation’s energy diversity and efficiency. The diversification of
energy sources decreases the potentially detrimental reliance on resources
that are susceptible to depletion. As the United States depletes its supply of
fossil fuels, it must import an increasing amount of such fuels from abroad
unless the country successfully promotes the incorporation of renewable
resources into its fuel production. Such diversification also reduces the
energy sector’s environmental impact by limiting the amount of pollution
that energy-related activities contribute to the atmosphere.54 Environmental
concerns clearly blended with economic considerations in the creation and
purpose of the Energy Policy Act. The encouragement of the use of
renewable resources allows Congress to pursue its objective of diversifying
energy sources, which in turn achieves Congress’s other goals of energy
efficiency, security, and independence, to protect the national economy by
preserving environmental resources.55
In order to achieve its energy goals, by codifying the renewable fuel
program, Congress established requirements for fuel refineries to
incorporate renewable fuels into their production of motor vehicle fuels.56
The renewable fuel program became effective in 2009.57 Congress
expressed concern, however, for small refineries that were likely to face
economic hardship due to these requirements. By applying a temporary
exemption to the requirements for small refineries, the renewable fuel
program provided an adjustment period for these businesses until at least
2011.58 The statute defines a “small refinery” as “a refinery for which the
average aggregate daily crude oil throughput for a calendar year . . . does
not exceed 75,000 barrels.59 The amount of a refinery’s fuel production thus
determined whether it automatically received an initial temporary
exemption from the requirements of the renewable fuel program. At least
during the initial years of the program’s existence, Congress’s concern for
the economic hardship of small refineries apparently outweighed its
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See 42 U.S.C.A § 7545(o)(1)(A).
See 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. S17, S22.
See id.
See 42 U.S.C.A § 7545(o)(2).
42 U.S.C.A § 7545.
Id. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(i).
Id. § 7545(o)(1)(K).
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concern for the environmental and nationwide economic impacts of
nonrenewable fuels.
Even after 2011, Congress continued to permit exemptions for small
refineries despite its interest in increasing the incorporation of renewable
resources in refineries’ production of fuels. If the Secretary of Energy
determined that a small refinery would disproportionately face economic
hardship under the renewable fuel program’s requirements, Congress
provided for an extension of the exemption for the refinery for at least two
years past 2011.60 This provision did not explain whether such an extension
must be immediately consecutive without any lapse in the application of the
exemption.61 Even if the Secretary of Energy did not determine that a small
refinery would face economic hardship sufficient to receive an extension,
however, Congress provided that “at any time” the refinery may “petition
the Administrator for an extension of the exemption . . . for the reason of
disproportionate economic hardship.”62 Congress left the meaning of “at
any time” unclear as the statute does not explicitly state whether a small
refinery can receive an extension after its initial exemption has lapsed.63
The ability of small refineries, such as Hollyfrontier Cheyenne Refining,
LLC, to comply with the requirements of the renewable fuel program after
their initial exemptions had lapsed resulted in litigation to determine
whether those refineries could receive nonconsecutive exemptions during
later years in which they are unable to comply with the program’s
requirements.64
III. HollyFrontier
The litigation against Hollyfrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC, and other
small refineries who attempted to receive exemptions from the
requirements of the renewable fuel program after allowing their initial
exemptions to lapse began in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit as a review of an EPA decision in January 2020.65 Upon writ
of certiorari, litigation continued when the parties argued the case in front
60. Id. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II).
61. See id.
62. Id. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i).
63. See id.
64. See HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refin., LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n, 141 S. Ct. 2172,
2175 (2021).
65. Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 948 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2020),
cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 974, 208 L. Ed. 2d 510 (2021) and rev'd, 141 S. Ct. 2172, 210 L.
Ed. 2d 547 (2021) and aff’d, 854 Fed. Appx. 983 (10th Cir. (2021).
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of the Supreme Court on April 27, 2021, and the Court decided the case of
HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Association on
June 25, 2021, with three justices dissenting.66 The litigation ended on July
29, 2021, when the Circuit Court vacated its previous judgment in
accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision.67
A. Facts and Procedural History
Even after their initial exemptions had lapsed, the EPA granted
“extensions” to exempt HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC, and two
other small refineries from a renewable fuel program standard.68 The
standard requires the incorporation of renewable fuels into refineries’
production of transportation fuels.69 Renewable fuel producers petitioned
the Tenth Circuit Court to review whether the EPA had statutory authority
to grant these extensions.70 The Circuit Court held allowing the initial
exemption to lapse resulted in a refinery’s ineligibility for an extension to
exemption from the renewable fuel program’s mandates, therefore vacating
the EPA’s grants of extensions to the three refineries.71
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision
After the small refineries petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari, to determine whether a small refinery is eligible to apply for an
extension to exemption from the renewable fuel program’s mandates after
allowing its initial exemption to lapse due to its temporary ability to
comply,72 the Court held the EPA has statutory authority to grant a small
refinery an extension of exemption from renewable fuel mandates despite a
previous lapse in exemption.73 The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s
judgment vacating the EPA’s decision to grant extensions of the exemption
from the renewable fuel mandates to the three refineries.74 It reasoned the
text of 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9) supports interpreting the term “extension” as
creating a “safety valve” for small refineries that are able to comply with
the renewable fuel mandate in certain years but not in all subsequent years
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

HollyFrontier, 141 S. Ct. 2172.
Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 854 Fed.Appx. 983 (Mem).
HollyFrontier, 141 S. Ct. at 2176.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2175.
Id. at 2183.
Id.
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due to changes in the market.75 Since Congress did not include an adjective
that would explicitly require that an extension of an exemption from the
statutory requirements be continuous, the majority opinion opted to
construe “extension” as permitting a lapse in effect.76 The Court’s
interpretation of the statutory language and subsequent ruling enables the
EPA to extend the exemptions from the mandates of the Clean Air Act’s
renewable fuel program from small refineries whose previous exemptions
have lapsed. Therefore, the Court’s decision reflects Congress’s concern for
the economic hardship of small refineries while disregarding Congress’s
concern for national environmental and economic hardship that failing to
comply with the requirements of the renewable fuel program will inevitably
cause.
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined Justice Barrett’s dissent from the
majority’s opinion.77 These justices disagreed with the majority’s
interpretation of the statutory language at issue.78 The dissent argues that
the construction that the majority of the Court imposes on the term “extend”
is an “outlier meaning” that does not adhere to the rules of statutory
interpretation.79 According to the dissent, the interpretation of the term
“extension” that Hollyfrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC, proposes, and
which the majority accepts, “strays [far] from the term’s ordinary
meaning.”80 Thus, the dissenting opinion reveals the majority opinion’s
focus on a permissible construction of the statutory language rather than on
an ordinary meaning of the language. The dissenting justices equated
“extension” with “continuation,”81 which indicates the absence of any lapse
in effect. These three justices, therefore, agree with the Tenth Circuit Court
that the “‘ordinary definitions of ‘extension,’ along with common sense,
dictate that the subject of an extension must be in existence before it can be
extended.’”82 If the EPA implemented the Clean Air Act’s renewable fuel
program in accordance with the dissenting opinion’s interpretation of the
75. See id. at 2182.
76. See id. at 2179.
77. Id. at 2183 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Barrett, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (Barrett, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2185 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 2183–84 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2184 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (quoting Renewable Fuels Assn. v. EPA, 948 F.3d
1206, 1245 (2020)).
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term “extension,” the small refineries that allowed their exemptions from
the program’s mandates to lapse would no longer receive any exemption.
Such a construction thus encourages these refineries to continuously strive
to incorporate renewable fuel into their production rather than depend on
economic fluctuation to determine whether they are able to comply with the
program’s mandates each year.
IV. Analysis of the Court’s Use of Statutory Interpretation Precedents
The majority opinion’s interpretation of the statutory language at issue
closely resembled the precedent of deference to the EPA’s permissible
construction that the Court established in Chevron. Although Hollyfrontier
and Chevron shared similarities regarding the EPA’s broad construction of
language in environmental statutes that implicate competing goals of
environmental preservation and economic development,83 the Court
attempted to distinguish the two cases by claiming not to defer to the EPA’s
interpretation of statutory language when the EPA has not invoked
Chevron.84 Unlike in Chevron, since the EPA did not request the Court to
defer to its construction of the statute at issue, the majority in Hollyfrontier
asserted that it “decline[d] to consider whether any deference might be due
its regulation.”85 In fact, the majority opinion acknowledges that the federal
respondent’s brief declares that “‘the government is not invoking
Chevron.’”86 Therefore, the Court implies that the permissible construction
canon of statutory interpretation does not apply when the government, or
the federal agency in charge of implementing the statute, does not request
deference to its construction of statutory language. The majority did not
explicitly utilize the permissible construction canon and even denied that
the Court “rule[d] for HollyFrontier because it has advanced a permissible
reading.”87 The dissent recognized that “[t]he Court avoids express reliance
on” a permissible construction argument.88 Nevertheless, the Court
appeared to defer to the EPA’s broad construction of the statutory language
at issue by implicitly utilizing the permissible construction canon of
statutory interpretation as its interpretation of the term “extension” relates

83. See HollyFrontier, 141 S. Ct. at 2180; Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840, 847 (1984).
84. See HollyFrontier, 141 S. Ct. at 2180.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 2181 n.3.
88. Id. at 2184 n.1 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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more closely to a permissible meaning than to the ordinary meaning of the
term.
Still, the majority opinion claimed to adhere to the ordinary meaning
canon and fair reading rule of statutory interpretation when construing the
use of the term “extension” in 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9).89 As it did in FDIC v.
Meyer, the Court referred to Black’s Law Dictionary to determine the
ordinary meaning of “extension.”90 It acknowledged that the tenth edition of
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “extension” as “‘[t]he continuation of the
same contract for a specified period.’”91 However, the decision noted that
even a “continuation” may allow a temporary lapse, according to other
renown dictionaries.92 The majority opinion relied on Black’s Law
Dictionary’s definition of “extension” but did not refer to Black’s Law
Dictionary’s definition of “continuation” or similar terms. While the tenth
edition defines “continuation” only in the context of patent continuation
applications,93 it defines “continuing” as “[u]ninterrupted.”94 The Court
failed to maintain consistency in its consideration of the ordinary meaning
of the term “extension” by relying on various dictionaries to serve its
construction of the statutory language rather than consistently referring to
Black’s Law Dictionary’s definitions of relevant terms. The Court utilized
the fair reading rule of statutory construction to conclude that, since the
statutory exemption does not explicitly require continuity, “[a] small
refinery can apply for (if not always receive) a hardship extension ‘at any
time,’” including after the exemption has lapsed.95 Although the Court
appeared to incorporate both the ordinary meaning canon and fair reading
rule in its construction of the statutory language, the decision more closely
reflects the Court’s utilization of the permissible construction canon
combined with the fair reading rule as the majority opinion neglected
applicable definitions that did not serve its preferred interpretation.
Furthermore, the Court did not refer to any previous editions of Black’s
Law Dictionary, which shed light on the ordinary meaning of the term
“extension” based on its historical legal definition. For example, the fifth
edition generally defines the term “extension” as “[a]n increase in length of
time” and notes that it “ordinarily implies the existence of something to be
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id. at 2176–77, 2181.
See id. at 2177–78.
Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 703 (10th ed. 2014)).
Id. at 2178.
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
Id.
HollyFrontier, 141 S. Ct. at 2181.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

16

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 8

extended.”96 In contrast to the majority opinion, the dissent adheres to such
an ordinary meaning of the term “extension” by agreeing with the Tenth
Circuit Court that an exemption must currently exist in order for the EPA to
be able to extend it.97
Moreover, the majority opinion failed to acknowledge the Black’s Law
Dictionary’s signal to compare the definition of “extension” with the
definition of “renewal,”98 which the tenth edition defines as “[t]he act of
restoring or reestablishing.”99 The dissenting opinion, on the other hand,
contrasted the two terms by referring to their opposing definitions in
Black’s Law Dictionary.100 The majority opinion’s initial utilization of
Black’s Law Dictionary and subsequent failure to follow its guidance
reveals the Court’s devotion to a construction of statutory language that
allows it to implicitly defer to the EPA’s interpretation, even when the
government does not request such deference, rather than arrive at a more
reasonable construction that would adhere to both a legal dictionary’s
definition and to ordinary usage of the term “extension.”
V. Potential Consequences of the Court’s Decision
The Court’s decision in Hollyfrontier turns on the absence of a single
word in the statute. Rather than requiring a small refinery to continuously
apply for an extension each year in order to seek an extension the
subsequent year, the Court construes “extension” to permit a lapse, based
on what the majority opinion claims to be the term’s ordinary usage, since
the statute does not state that extensions must be “consecutive” or
“successive.”101 Since the government did not ask the Court to defer to the
EPA’s interpretation of “extension” by invoking Chevron, the Court
claimed to decline to give such deference.102 Nevertheless, the Court
appears to invoke Chevron itself and defer to the EPA’s interpretation of
“extension” as permitting a lapse in continuity as such an interpretation
reflects a permissible construction of the statute rather than the ordinary
meaning of the term. In contrast, the dissenting opinion’s interpretation of
96. Black’s Law Dictionary 523 (5th ed. 1979) (citing State v. Graves, 182 S.W.2d 46,
51) (emphasis added).
97. See HollyFrontier, 141 S. Ct. at 2184 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (quoting Renewable
Fuels Assn. v. EPA, 948 F.3d 1206, 1245 (2020)).
98. See Black's Law Dictionary 703 (10th ed. 2014).
99. Id.
100. HollyFrontier, 141 S. Ct. at 2185 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 2177; see id. at 2179.
102. Id. at 2180.
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the statute relies on a construction of the term “extension” that more
accurately reflects its ordinary meaning.103 In 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9), the
omission of language indicating that extensions must be “consecutive” or
“successive” is irrelevant if the ordinary meaning of “extension” implies
that lapses in effect are prohibited. The Court’s apparent deference to the
EPA may encourage lower courts to defer to permissible interpretations of
statutes rather than construing terms and phrases in such statutes in
accordance with their ordinary meaning, which may in turn encourage
Congress to continue to use ambiguous language in its legislation.
Ambiguous language and deference to permissible interpretations
diminishes predictability of the implementation of statutory provisions and
increases litigation such as the case at issue. By deciding this case in favor
of the small refineries based on a permissible interpretation of the term
“extension,” the Court missed its opportunity to encourage Congress to
include more explicit language in statutes.
If Congress intended to allow small refineries to be eligible for
extensions of exemption even after they had allowed their initial exemption
to lapse, then Congress should have used the term “renewal” rather than
“extension” in order to prevent ambiguity. The dissenting opinion contrasts
the two terms to demonstrate that the ordinary meaning of the latter term
requires the continuous existence of the subject of extension.104 “Renewal”
is a more appropriate word for a statutory provision that permits
exemptions from the statute’s mandates as its ordinary meaning does not
require continuity. The absence of the term “renewal” in the statute implies
that Congress did not intend to allow refineries that did not continuously
seek an exemption from the statute’s mandates to later receive one.
By refusing to interpret “extension” as requiring continuity, the Court’s
decision enables an unlimited number of small refineries to deplete
nonrenewable resources. Interpreting the statute as requiring continuity
would instead encourage adaptation rather than dependence on the market
structure. Furthermore, such an interpretation would limit the number of
refineries that are exempt from the requirements of the renewable fuel
program and therefore promote the goals of the Energy Policy Act of 2005
by reducing reliance on fossil fuels. Recent environmental changes serve as
a constant reminder that survival of the fittest requires adaptation to survive
both economic and environmental hardship. Unless small refineries learn to
adapt to the requirements of the renewable fuel program, their overuse of
103. See id. at 2185 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
104. See id. (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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fossil fuels will eventually result in their demise due to the depletion of
nonrenewable energy sources. While the majority of the Court correctly
advises that the dissent's reading encourages continuous noncompliance,105
the EPA still has the discretion regarding whether to grant the extension
based on its assessment of actual hardship.106
VI. Conclusion
In HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels
Association, the Supreme Court opted for a permissible interpretation of the
term “extension” in 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(9) based on a fair reading of the
statute to allow a small refinery to seek exemption from renewable fuel
mandates after a lapse in the continuity of the refinery’s initial exemption.
By failing to construe the term as requiring continuity in accordance with
its ordinary meaning, the Court declined the opportunity to reduce the
depletion of nonrenewable fuels in the production of transportation fuels.
As a result of the Supreme Court’s June 2021 ruling, the Tenth Circuit
vacated its previous judgment that vacated the EPA’s grants of exemptions
to the three refineries.107 The Supreme Court’s decision thus removed
temporal limits on the ability of small refineries to avoid compliance with
the renewable fuel program’s requirements.

105. Id. at 2182.
106. See 42 U.S.C.A § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii).
107. Renewable Fuels Association v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,
854 Fed. Appx. 983 (10th Cir. 2021) (mem.).
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